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In the European Union, a dizzying array of institutional arrangements exist for the
implementation of the common policies set out in the Treaties and secondary
instruments.1 Policymakers and scholars have classically identified two modes of
European administration: administration of select policy areas such as competition by the
Commission (direct administration) and administration of the rest by national
governments, with no or little interference from above (indirect administration).2 The
powers exercised by the Commission are unknown in other international regimes, given
the reluctance in virtually every other part of the world to cede the sovereignty necessary
to institute such a supranational body. The administrative powers exercised by member
states, however, are typical of most international regimes, the World Trade Organization,
the Council of Europe, and the Climate Change Convention, just to name a few.
Over the past couple of years, attention has shifted to a new and varied set of
institutional processes designed to curb national discretion in the second form of
European administration, that is, indirect administration.3 European legislation often
imposes requirements on national authorities, such as independence from the executive
branch and the duty to consult interest groups. Member states are subject to extensive
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reporting duties, so that the Commission can monitor their track records on rulemaking
and enforcement and, in extreme cases of non-compliance, step in with proposals for new
European legislation or with enforcement actions. A series of European agencies have
been established, not to replace domestic administration, but rather to serve as an
alternative for firms which are dissatisfied with the national mechanisms for granting,
say, European new drug approvals and European trademarks. Lastly, in a number of
areas, directives and other secondary instruments have instituted an elaborate sequence of
administrative decisions, known as "mixed" or "composite" administration. Through this
process, national authorities, engaging in indirect administration, promulgate rules and
bring enforcement actions, but are checked and, in some instances their decisions
reversed, by the Commission and other member states.
This article analyzes mixed administration through a detailed case study of the
operation of the European Data Protection Directive in Italy.4 For purposes of this
article, a mixed procedure is an administrative process, established by Treaty or European
legislation, in which national and European administration share responsibility for a
single determination of rights and duties under European law.5 The determination might,
to draw on categories familiar in systems of domestic administrative law, be specific to
an individual or firm, i.e. administrative adjudication, or be generally applicable to a class
3
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of firms or individuals, i.e. administrative rulemaking. The procedure is structured
similar to a judicial hierarchy: national authorities make the initial decision which is then
reviewed by European administration, generally consisting of the Commission and a
committee of national representatives who decide by qualified majority vote (comitology
committee). This administrative architecture is highly unusual, even in a federal system
like Germany in which legislative and administrative authority, including administrative
rulemaking and enforcement, is generally split between federal government on the one
hand and Länder governments on the other. The operative verb in this characterization of
the German system is split, not share, as in the case of the EU. While the German
government has many tools for supervising Länder authorities, serving as an appeals
body for administrative decisions is not one of them.6
The article proceeds in four parts. First, I analyze the mixed procedure for
transfers of personal information to third countries as it appears on the face of the Data
Protection Directive. Second, I describe the experience with the procedure in the brief
period from implementation of the Data Protection Directive to the present day and
conclude that it has not yet come to life. Third, I suggest that the sharing of
administrative responsibility creates special problems for democratic accountability and,
to a lesser extent, individual rights. This conclusion rests largely on the actual practice of
third country data transfers rather than on the formal process laid down in the Directive.
Decisionmaking on third country transfers has been characterized by informality and
failure to act, forms of administrative action which are notoriously difficult for courts to
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police. Yet political accountability, which in domestic systems generally compensates
for the lack of judicial review, is weak in the European Union.
Lastly, I turn to the larger puzzle of why member states sometimes decide to
retain administrative authority for themselves, i.e. classic indirect administration, and
other times decide to share it with the Commission and other member states sitting in
comitology committees. Data protection is a policy area in which member states have
preferred, on balance, to administer European law with little interference from the
Commission, rather than institute mixed procedures.7 I draw on political science
literature on European integration and the theory of credible commitments to offer an
explanation for this choice. My review of the history of the Directive suggests that the
choice in favor of national sovereignty was driven by radical disagreement among the
member states on the data protection issue. Because views on the importance of
information privacy as a civil liberty differed significantly among member states, both
those in favor and those opposed to information privacy resisted the transfer of
policymaking authority to a supranational forum in which the other side might prevail. In
the words of the political science literature, the common interest in privacy was too
feeble, preferences too varied, for member states to credibly commit themselves to a
future stream of decisions through a joint administrative apparatus.

1. Mixed procedure in European data protection law
1.1. The Data Protection Directive
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The Data Protection Directive contemplates mixed procedures in two instances,
both of which relate to external trade. Under the Directive, member states are required to
ensure that third countries to which personal data are transferred provide "an adequate
level of protection" for the data.8 A mixed procedure is triggered in two distinct
circumstances: a national privacy authority finds that a third country fails to ensure an
adequate level of protection and decides to block a transfer or, conversely, a national
privacy authority decides to permit a transfer to an inadequate country because special
protections are in place.
Take the example of a country with a problem with identity theft because its
regulators fail to require rigid security measures of data processors. In the first type of
mixed procedure, a national privacy authority which discovered the problem would be
obliged to make a finding of inadequacy and block transfers of personal information to
that country. That same privacy authority would be required to report its finding to the
Commission, which in turn could initiate a procedure to block data transfers to that third
country throughout the Union or could enter into negotiations with the third country with
an eye to improving privacy protection.9 The Directive contemplates a Commission
decision of adequacy upon completion of the negotiations, which would be valid for all
member states, although in theory and in practice the Commission decision can come at
any time and not necessarily as the final stage of bilateral negotiations. Whenever the
Commission takes action in this domain it must act through a comitology committee of
member state representatives and must seek the opinion of the working party of national
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data protection authorities.10 Both courses of action are entirely discretionary, meaning
that even though a member state may find that its citizens' privacy rights are abused by a
third country, the Commission may or may not require that other member states also
block data transfers to that third country and may or may not enter into negotiations with
that third country.11 Furthermore, both decisions may be initiated by the Commission
alone, not exclusively by the member states, and therefore they do not necessarily
represent the culmination of a mixed procedure.
The second mixed procedure involves the decision to allow data transfers to
inadequate third countries. Even if a third country does not guarantee an adequate level
of privacy protection, member states may authorize transfers on six separate grounds
listed in the Data Protection Directive.12 Member states are permitted to authorize
transfers on additional grounds, not specifically enumerated in the Directive, but, in such
cases, they must notify the Commission and the other member states. To return to the
example of a country with identity theft problems, a member state might decide to permit
a transfer if there is a contract rendering the receiving party liable in tort for any loss or
10
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European Commission, Data Protection in the European Union, p. 12, available at:
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theft of the personal information. That decision would have to be notified to the
Commission and the other member states.13 If either the Commission or another member
state objected to the transfer, the matter would be taken up by the Commission and the
comitology committee, which then would make the final decision on whether to permit
the transfer.

1.2. Italian implementing legislation
Italy enacted legislation implementing the Data Protection Directive in 1996 and
subsequently promulgated a number of amending regulations.14 In 2003, the entire
corpus of legislation was systematized and modified slightly in the Personal Data
Protection Code.15 The legal duties in the Directive and the Italian implementing law
operate as standards which data users are expected to follow or else face administrative
action and judicial sanctions. Personal data users are not required, for the most part, to
submit their data processing operations to the national privacy authority for review and
approval before the operations may commence.
The reliance upon legal duties and sanctions rather than licensing and screening
applies to transfers to inadequate third countries. The data controller is bound by the duty
to stop transfers of data to inadequate third countries:
[I]t shall be prohibited to transfer personal data that are the subject of
processing from the State’s territory to countries outside the European
Union, temporarily or not, and in any form and by any means whatsoever,
if the laws of the country of destination or transit of the data do not ensure
necessary to protect the "vital interests" of the data subject; and the transfer is from a data base to which the
public routinely has access because of national laws on access to documents.
13
Data Protection Directive, art. 26.
14
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15
Legislative decree n. 196 of 30 June 2003.

7

Francesca Bignami
an adequate level of protection of individuals. Account shall also be taken
of the methods used for the transfer and the envisaged processing
operations, the relevant purposes, nature of the data and security measures.
Art. 45. If the Italian Personal Data Protection Authority (“Garante”) suspects that a data
controller has breached this duty, it may undertake an investigation and impose certain
restrictions on, or block altogether, future data transfers of the same type.16 Failure to
comply with an administrative injunction of this sort can lead to criminal prosecution and
imprisonment of three months to two years.17 Moreover, individuals harmed by the
transfer of their personal information in violation of the law, may sue for material
damages as well as emotional distress (danni non-patrimoniali).18 Lastly, in extreme
cases the Garante can refer breaches to the public prosecutor, who may bring a criminal
prosecution for imprisonment between one and three years.19 Any administrative or
judicial decision to impose a sanction for transfer to an inadequate third country would
have to be notified to the European Commission under the Data Protection Directive.
Tracking the Directive, the Italian law enumerates exceptions to the ban on
transfers to third countries with inadequate privacy safeguards.20 The Italian legislation
also provides that the Garante may allow such transfers on grounds other than those
specifically enumerated in the legislation, such as privacy-protecting contractual terms.21
These exceptions can come either in the form of an individual authorization, giving a data
user assurances, in advance of a particular transfer, that the Garante will not take
enforcement action or in the form of a block authorization, permitting certain classes of
16
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transfers. As described above, under the Data Protection Directive, such exceptions must
be notified to the European Commission and the other member states and may give rise
to objections from other member states or the Commission, objections which would then
trigger a comitology procedure.

2. Experience with the mixed procedure for international data transfers
To date, the Commission has issued adequacy decisions for five countries:
Hungary, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and Argentina.22 In the case of the
United States, the decision applies not to the overall regulatory framework for privacy
protection but to certain "Safe Harbor Principles" which, if respected by exporting firms,
guarantee compliance with Directive’s adequacy requirement. The Commission has also
issued two decisions specifying standard contract clauses which guarantee privacy rights
notwithstanding an inadequate public regulatory regime.23 The Garante has implemented
all of these decisions, with the exception of the Argentina adequacy determination,
through block authorizations (autorizzazioni generali).24 Italian firms and public entities
which export to Hungary, Switzerland, Canada, or the United States, respecting the Safe
Harbor Principles, or include the standard clauses in their contracts, can rest assured that
they are in compliance with Italian data protection law. (Under European law, the same
applies to Argentina since individuals may rely on the Commission's Argentina decision
21

Id. at art. 44.
Commission Decision 2000/519/EC, 2000 O.J. L 215/4 (Hungary), Commission Decision 2000/518/EC,
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Commission Decision 2002/2/EC, 2002 O.J. L 2/13 (Canada), Commission Decision 2003/490/EC, 2003
O.J. L 168/19 (Argentina).
23
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even in the absence of an Italian implementing act.) In addition, the working party of
European privacy authorities, established under Article 29 of the Directive, has issued an
opinion on Australia, finding that its data protection regime is inadequate in certain
respects.25 The Commission has entered into discussions with Australia to secure
additional privacy safeguards.26
When the Data Protection Directive was first drafted it was expected that an
assessment of privacy in third countries would be made initially by member state
authorities and then, over time, any dissatisfaction would percolate up to the
Commission. As the national regulators on the Council's working party said in the
negotiations on the Directive:
[This article] gives a certain degree of flexibility to the member states.
Initially, it is for them to decide, following procedures that they will
choose themselves, on the adequate level of protection in third countries,
taking into account certain criteria enumerated in [Article 25.2]. In a later
phase, a Community procedure will be launched in order to ensure a
common approach which is well-structured in this area.27
Yet no member state has ever notified the Commission, pursuant to Article 25 of the
Directive, of a decision to block a data transfer because of adequacy problems.28 Each of
the Commission adequacy decisions surveyed above was initiated by another actor: the

24
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Commission or the third country itself.29 Therefore the first of the mixed procedures
established under the Data Protection Directive is, in practice, a dead letter.
The second mixed procedure, the authorization of transfers to inadequate third
countries, has seen more use but still is insignificant in light of the volume of
international transactions with countries without information privacy legislation or with
only minimal public protections. According to figures reported in December 2002, on
seventeen occasions, national authorities have notified the Commission of authorizations
to export personal information to third countries without an adequacy finding.30 Most of
these have involved transfers under contracts which the national data protection authority
found to guarantee individual privacy rights. Spain has shown itself to be the most active
in the area, with eight notifications, followed by Finland with four, Portugal with three,
and Germany and the Netherlands each with one. None of these notifications, however,
have resulted in further, European-wide action, since neither the member states nor the
Commission raised objections which would trigger a comitology procedure.
The Commission has recognized that the joint administration of privacy in the
international trade context is disappointing. In a report on the implementation of the Data
Protection Directive issued in May 2003, it was critical of national enforcement.
According to the Commission:

29

In the case of Argentina, the Argentinian government sought an adequacy decision from the
Commission. See Opinion 4/2002 on the level of protection of personal data in Argentina, October 3,
2002, DG MARKT 11081/02/EN WP 63, at 2. The Commission initiated adequacy proceedings for
Switzerland and Hungary because both had ratified the Council of Europe Convention, thus providing
prima facie evidence of adequacy, and both showed some interest in obtaining adequacy decisions. In the
case of Canada and the United States, both governments initiated discussions with the Commission with an
eye to avoiding trade disruptions. See e-mail communication from European Commission, DG Markt,
Unit Data Protection (Dec. 18, 2002).
30
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many unauthorised and possibly illegal transfers are being made to
destinations or recipients not guaranteeing adequate protection.31
It called the number of notifications under the second of the mixed procedures, i.e.
Article 26, “derisory by comparison with what might reasonably be expected.”32 The
Commission believes that transfers to countries without adequate privacy safeguards are
being made and that national authorities have failed to clamp down, either by prohibiting
the transfers or by requiring special guarantees. In a subsequent letter, the Commission
urged national privacy authorities to ensure that authorizations, allowing export of
personal information to inadequate third countries, are notified to the Commission and
other member states.33 In other words, the Commission called upon national
administrations to put into practice the second of the mixed procedures foreseen in the
Directive. The Commission identified three related goals: improving the level of
protection for Europeans’ personal information outside of the Union, increasing
awareness among national regulators and the Commission of the circumstances
surrounding third country transfers, and facilitating the exchange of best practices when
personal information is sent to inadequate third countries.

3. Individual rights and democratic accountability
3.1. The theory of mixed administration
In the following section, I analyze mixed procedure from the perspective of
traditional administrative law values of individual rights and accountability to elected
31

Report from the Commission: First report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive
(95/46/EC), COM(2003) 265 final at p. 19 (May 15, 2003).
32
Id.
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officials. The analysis is divided into two parts. In the first, the fate of rights and
accountability in mixed administration, as it is designed to operate under the letter of the
Data Protection Directive, is scrutinized. In the second part, I undertake the same
exercise, but this time for the actual practice of mixed procedure, which departs
significantly from the letter of the Data Protection Directive.
For purposes of clarity, the sequence of decisionmaking is summarized below,
organized under the Directive’s provisions on third country transfers.
Domestic Phase
Article 25 (Transfer to adequate third countries)
(1) An administrative decision to block a particular data transfer or enjoin future
data transfers based on a finding that the third country is inadequate. Technically,
this would be issued as an order (provvedimento) of the Garante.34
Article 26 (Exceptions to the adequacy principle)
(2) An administrative decision to authorize a data transfer based on a finding that
the particulars of the transaction will guarantee privacy, regardless of the
adequacy of the third country's privacy laws. This would be issued by the
Garante as an authorization (autorizzazione).35
(3) An administrative rule authorizing certain types of transfers, regardless of the
adequacy of the third country's privacy laws. This would issued by the Garante as
a general authorization (autorizzazione generale).36
European Phase
Article 25 (Transfer to adequate third countries)
Commission negotiations with the third country found "inadequate" by the
Garante leads to a change in the country's privacy regime and the Commission

33

Note from the Commission to Member States and Data Protection Authorities, Markt/E4/LCN/ck D
(2003) 270 (Aug. 21, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/lawreport/notification-art-26_en.pdf.
34
Data Protection Code, art. 154.
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Id. at art. 44
36
Id.

13

Francesca Bignami
acting in conjunction with the working party and comitology committee issues a
decision finding that the country is "adequate."
The Garante gives effect to the Commission decision with a rule
(autorizzazione generale) allowing transfers to the third country to which
transfers previously prohibited.
Article 26 (Exceptions to adequacy principle)
Commission, acting in conjunction with the comitology committee, issues a
decision finding that the safeguards deemed by the Garante to guarantee privacy
are not protective enough.
The Garante gives effect to the Commission decision by revoking the
specific authorization (autorizzazione) permitting a third country transfer
or the general authorization (autorizzazione generale) permitting a class of
transfers.
If individual rights are taken to mean the opportunity to participate in
administrative determinations and the ability to challenge such determinations in an
independent judicial forum, mixed procedure in the privacy area is not problematic.
Generally speaking, a strong right to participate in administrative decisionmaking does
not exist in continental legal systems.37 Rather, individual rights are protected through
the availability of review in an independent forum, which in countries like Germany is
part of the judiciary and in countries like France and Italy is a separate branch of
government administration. In Italy, however, over the past decade there has been a
trend towards greater proceduralization of the administrative process. A law passed in
1990 guarantees the right of participation in administrative adjudications: affected
individuals have a right to examine the administrative record, submit written arguments

37

On the traditional approach, see Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the State: The Europeanization and
Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 Eur. Pub. L. 563, 566 (2003).
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and evidence, and receive a decision in writing which gives reasons and shows that their
position has been considered.38
The Garante adheres to the requirements of the 1990 law.39 Therefore, a firm
which considered that, contrary to the Garante’s belief, a third country did offer adequate
protections (first type of administrative action) or that a contract was protective of
privacy rights (second type of administrative action) would have the opportunity to
persuade the Garante in an administrative proceeding. Even in rulemaking, which in
Italian and continental law more generally is considered a matter of discretionary
policymaking and does not give rise to legal rights of individual participation, the
Garante has a reputation for consulting the community of interested individuals and
firms. Therefore a firm or individual with opinions on a rule prohibiting or permitting a
certain class of transfers (third type of administrative action) would probably be heard,
albeit in a very loose sense of the word.
If the Garante's determination triggers review by the Commission and a
comitology committee, or, in other words, triggers the European phase of the
administrative proceeding, individual participation would be guaranteed only if the
European determination turned on the particular facts of an individual data transfer.40
This would most likely arise where the Garante had approved a foreign transfer based on
a contract submitted by an individual firm (second type of administrative action).
Otherwise, neither the Data Protection Directive nor the general background provisions
disciplining comitology require that individuals be allowed to make submissions or argue

38

Law n. 241/1990. See Aldo Sandulli, Il Procedimento, 2 Diritto Amministrativo Generale 1031 (Sabino
Cassese et al. eds., 2000).
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40
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their case before the Commission or the committee. Thus, if an Italian determination
involving a general assessment of a third country’s adequacy (first type of administrative
action) or a model contract (third type of administrative action) were then submitted to
European-wide review, individuals would not have a right to participate. In the absolute,
this might be objectionable, but if the benchmark is the state of affairs at the national
level in the absence of mixed procedure, the lack of participation is not particularly
disturbing. As discussed above, there has never been a strong right of participation in
administrative proceedings in Italy, especially in what is considered discretionary
policymaking, which covers the vast majority of what Union institutions decide in the
privacy area. The lack of procedural guarantees in the European phase of mixed
procedure is not a cause for concern.
Judicial review, which in the continental tradition bears most of the burden of
guaranteeing that individuals are fairly treated by government administration, is also
fairly robust in the formal operation of mixed administrative proceedings. Although
there is, as of yet, no practical experience in Italy with the procedure for international
information transfers, it is clear that judicial review would be available under standard
principles of Italian administrative law.41 Assume for the moment that the Garante's
decision does not trigger a comitology proceeding. If the decision were of the first or
second type, judicial review would be easy to obtain. The Italian concept of “legitimate
41

The Italian data protection legislation modifies the background administrative law system by specifying
that all challenges to the Garante's decisions, regardless of whether they involve "subjective rights" or
"legitimate interests" are to be brought in the civil courts. Data Protection Code, art. 152. Both “legitimate
interests” and “subjective rights” serve as the functional equivalent of standing in American law but a
distinction is drawn for purposes of allocating jurisdiction between the administrative courts and the
ordinary, civil courts. The Italian data protection law therefore improves the availability of judicial review
by avoiding the time-consuming process of deciding in which court--civil or administrative--to bring a suit.
Furthermore, the civil courts are generally believed to be more rights friendly and less deferential to the
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interest,” which serves as a functional equivalent of standing in American law, would
cover a data-exporting firm’s financial interest in challenging a prohibition on a data
transfer. Likewise, an individual would very likely be found to have the “subjective
right” necessary to challenge the authorization of a particular data transfer because of the
fundamental nature of privacy rights and the material injury and emotional distress which
could result from the misuse of her private information.
If the decision were a rule giving the green light to a class of information
transfers, however, it would be difficult to obtain judicial review (third type of
administrative action). In Italian law, individuals are generally not believed to have
interests which can be adversely affected by broadly constructed administrative action
and vindicated through judicial review.42 They would have to wait until the rule was
applied in a specific case, say the Garante denied an individual petition to stop a data
transfer based on a general authorization. And even then, judicial review would be
limited to the question of whether the general authorization was “illegal,” which is a very
limited inquiry.
Now assume that the Garante's decision triggers a comitology proceeding, which
results in an opposite determination. That is, the Italian authorities prohibit data transfers
to a third country but, after negotiations and review by the Commission, that third
country is found to be adequate. The Garante, therefore, is required to issue a general
authorization permitting such transfers. Or the Garante authorizes certain transfers to
"inadequate" third countries, which, on review by the Commission and comitology

government than administrative courts and hence individual rights should be better protected under this
scheme.
42
Jacques Ziller, Le cotrôle du pouvoir réglementaire en Europe, 9 L’Actualité Juridique Droit
Administratif 635, 642 (1999).
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committee, are found to lack adequate privacy safeguards. The Garante, therefore, is
required to revoked the authorization. If an individual application for a transfer is at
stake (second type of administrative act) then the Commission's reversal would be
amenable to review, either in the Court of Justice or by way of a preliminary reference
through the national courts in a challenge to the Garante's final decision. Otherwise,
where the effect is a general, rule-like determination, the Commission's reversal would
become amenable to review when applied, by the Garante, to permit or prohibit a specific
third country transfer. The data subject, in the case of a transfer to a supposedly
“adequate” third country, or the data user, in the case of the prohibition of a transfer
under supposedly defective contractual guarantees, could go to court to object to the
Garante’s enforcement decision and the Commission's determination on which it was
based.
On balance, it does not appear that access to judicial review has been
compromised by mixed administration. Although to a French or American eye the Italian
law on access to judicial review might appear quite restrictive, the fact remains that
administrative decisions may—or may not—be challenged whether the Garante acts
alone or European administration also intervenes.43 Likewise, intensity of judicial
review, that is how carefully administrative decisions are scrutinized on substantive
grounds of lawfulness, reasonableness, and so on, does not appear to suffer. Both Italian
courts and the European Court of Justice give significant deference to administrative
determinations and therefore the transfer of judicial review powers to the Court of

43
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Administratif 635, 640 (1999).
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Justice, implicit in the preliminary reference procedure, does not appreciably lower
standards of judicial review.
On accountability to elected officials, by contrast, mixed administration is weak.
Say a trade union is unhappy with the experience of transfers of employee data abroad
because it believes that, through the transfers, employers have been able to circumvent
Italian labor laws and use the information to discriminate against employees. To which
elected official does it complain? Can the union just complain to national
parliamentarians and members of government or is a broader assault, perhaps through the
European Trade Union Congress, on other governments and the European Parliament
necessary? To choose, the trade union must determine whether the Garante alone, or also
the European institutions, are responsible for the transfers abroad. And to do that, it
would have to identify which administrative acts declaring certain countries adequate or
certain types of transactions protective of privacy interests, were the true culprits and,
within that set of acts, whether the Garante or the European process, was responsible for
the determination. In a world of multiple variables and uncertain causation, this type of
identification is generally impossible. Consequently, the performance of administrative
agencies in domestic systems of accountability is generally evaluated through track
records. Yet, in this hypothetical, it is entirely unclear whether the track record to blame
is the Italian one or the European one.

3.2. The practice of mixed administration
The reality of European privacy administration alters significantly the normative
assessment, both on the rights and accountability scores. The law of mixed procedure, as
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set down in the Data Protection Directive, presumes an orderly succession of
administrative decisions: the Garante issues a decision, which is reviewed by the
Commission and comitology committee and results in another decision, which,
depending on the outcome, is followed by a final Italian implementing act. This has
proven to be pure fiction. The record does not contain one single episode of this kind.
Rather, on international data transfer issues, the Italian approach, like that of most other
national data protection authorities, has been to wait and see. The Garante has not used
its power to block or authorize data transfers. This is to the detriment of both data
subjects, whose privacy rights are not protected when their information is sent abroad,
and data users, which operate under conditions of legal uncertainty. In the language of
American administrative law, the Garante has failed to act.
Action, instead, has come from EU institutions, and it has come in two forms.
First, the Article 29 working party of data protection authorities has developed common
criteria for evaluating third country adequacy and contract clauses. These common
criteria are informal, taking the form of opinions,44 working documents,45 and unwritten
consensus among the members of the working party. Second, as reviewed above, the
Commission and comitology committee have issued formal decisions on third countries
and model contracts.46
Inaction and informal action are both problematic in administrative law. Neither
is susceptible to judicial review. Courts are generally aware of their institutional limits
and are reluctant to dictate a particular course of action for an agency. By definition,
44

See, e.g., Opinion 3/2001 on the level of protection of the Australian Privacy Amendment (Privacy
Sector) Act 2000, 26 January 2001, DG MARKT 5095/00 WP 40.
45
See Transfers of personal data to third countries: applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU data protection
Directive, 24 July 1998, WP 12.
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informal action is difficult to discern, and even when it is identifiable, courts are reluctant
to deprive agencies of this flexible mode of action by imposing ordinary standards of
judicial review, which require a high level of proof and justification. When
administrative action takes the form of inaction or informal action, the political process
rather than courts must police for arbitrariness and illegality. A government authority
which fails to take the action necessary to implement certain statutory mandates or which
informally implements the statute contrary to public opinion can expect to face pressure
from elected officials.
The problem with the mixed procedure for international data transfers is twofold.
First, the sharing of powers between national and European authorities appears to have
generated even more of the judicially immune form of administrative action than is
normally the case in purely national policymaking. National authorities, rather than
experiment based on their domestic experiences with information privacy, and block or
authorize certain transfers, have preferred inaction.47 Because it is so difficult to
anticipate the threats to individual privacy and devise measures that will adequately
safeguard privacy rights once the information leaves the EU, national data protection
commissioners have chosen to transfer responsibility to the European process. The
European process, however, is inherently slow, meaning that inaction can persist for long
periods, and the type of administrative action it tends to generate is informal. The
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See Section Two of this paper.
The lack of local experimentation is surprisingly, as it runs contrary to the expectations of some of the
literature on European governance. See, e.g., Joanne Scott & David Trubeck, Mind the Gap: Law and New
Approaches to Governance in the EU, 8 Eur. L. J. 1 (2002). Under certain circumstances it is predicted that
different approaches to the same policy problem will emerge and will eventually lead to the adoption of
best practices as well as the continuation of beneficial plurality, suited to local differences. The
negotiations that led to the adoption of the Data Protection Directive show that the drafters intended for the
mixed procedure to foster precisely this form of experimentalism. National regulators, however, have
preferred to shift responsibility for this thorny policy area to the EU rather than experiment locally.
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agreement generated in a few e-mail exchanges among data protection regulators or the
consensus in a working document or opinion is not subject to judicial review.
The second problem with the European administrative process is that political
accountability, which generally compensates for the inability of courts to police
administrative inaction and informal administrative action, is weak. As argued above, the
sharing of authority means that it is unclear which administrations and which elected
politicians should bear the brunt of public dissatisfaction. Moreover, if the EU process is
to blame, a European-wide campaign is extremely costly and difficult to mount, even for
an organized group like labor, which, unlike many other interest groups, has a Europeanwide federation, the European Trade Union Congress. In sum, the administrative practice
of third country transfers is low on both judicial and political oversight, thus
compromising administrative law ideals of rights and political accountability.

4. Explaining the administrative architecture of the Data Protection Directive
Curiously, with the exception of international data transfers, mixed administration
is missing from the architecture of European privacy law. There were many areas in
which mixed administration could have usefully harmonized national application of the
Data Protection Directive.48 The following section reviews a branch of political science
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In fall 2002, the Commission called for comments on the implementation of the Data Protection
Directive. The companies and trade associations that responded were unanimous in calling for greater
uniformity among the member states in their application of the Directive. See Bundesverband der
Duetschen Industrie, Joint position on the online consultation by the European Commission (DG Internal
Market) on application of the Data protection directive 95/46/EC, September 4, 2002 (calling for greater
uniformity on the question of whether personal data covers both natural persons and firms, on conditions
for obtaining consent, on a firm's place of establishment for purposes of determining applicable law, and on
notification procedures); Confederation of British Industry, Comments on Directive 95/46 re data
protection (calling for greater uniformity on obtaining consent); UNICE, Implementation of Directive
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data of 24 October 1995, August 30, 2002 (calling attention to disparities in levels of

22

Francesca Bignami
research on the institutional dynamics of European integration and argues that the privacy
case provides support for the theory that transfers of sovereignty only occur when
governments wish to credibly commit to mutually beneficial policies.
Very briefly, the Directive follows the earlier Council of Europe Convention in
imposing a number of requirements on those who collect, use, and transfer personal
information. Personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully; personal information
can be collected only for specific and legitimate purposes; the amount of information
collected may not be excessive in relation to those purposes; personal data must be
accurate; and information can be kept no longer than necessary to fulfill the original
purpose of collection.49 The Directive extensively elaborates on the original Council of
Europe principles. It specifies the information which must be provided to individuals
when their data is collected, the types of personal information which may and may not be
collected, the circumstances under which that information may be used, and the rights of
individuals in checking on their information. The Directive, however, allows member
states considerable leeway in interpreting the substantive standards to which data
processors are held.
The enforcement scheme contemplated in the Directive relies on a combination of
notification, generally to the data protection authority, before commencing processing
operations, authorization for operations defined by member states as posing special risks

data protection generally and definitions of consent and sensitive data in particular); Presentation of Prof.
Dr. Büllesbach, Daimler Chrysler, September 30, 2002 (calling for uniformity on question of whether
Directive protects both natural persons and firms, consent, sensitive data, establishment, notification
requirements, and third country transfers); Covington & Burling, Comments on Implementation and
Application of the 1995 Data Protection Directive (recommending uniformity in the definitions of personal
data and establishment and calling for a greater role of Art. 29 Working Party in eliminating inconsistent
interpretations at the national level). These comments may be found at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/dataprot/lawreport/papers_en.htm.
49
Directive, art. 6.
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to privacy, and administrative and judicial enforcement of standards. As with the
Directive’s substantive provisions, member states enjoy considerable discretion in
implementing the regulatory scheme. For instance, Italy has chosen to eliminate, with
only a few exceptions, notification, and to make extensive use of authorization and
administrative enforcement.
In all of these areas, the drafters of the Directive could have provided for mixed
administration. The member states could very well have been required to notify the
Commission of their rules and allow other member states and the Commission to object
to the standards that went beyond the baseline set in the Directive.50 Countries which
require authorization for sensitive data could have been required to notify the
Commission when they granted or denied authorizations. The same type of European
procedure could have been put in place for national investigations and sanctions, as
occurs in the food safety area51 and in the competition area.52 After all, a corporation
which is alleged to have violated privacy rights in one member state might very well have
violated them elsewhere, in which case the duty to inform is vital. Or the same
investigation might be undertaken in multiple jurisdictions, creating the danger of
contradictory decisions under the same provisions of the Data Protection Directive.
Why, then, this paucity of shared administrative responsibility? A number of
political scientists have examined the institutional choices made in the Treaties and in
50

This is not as speculative as it might seem on its face. In the free movement of goods area, the member
states are required to notify the Commission of new technical standards and the Commission or other
member states may object on the grounds that they create barriers to trade which are not justified for
legitimate public policy reasons. See Council Directive 83/189/EEC, 1983 O.J. 109/8, arts. 8-9.
51
In the event of an outbreak of disease in livestock, national authorities must take protective measures and
notify the Commission and other member states. If the Commission or other member states find the
measures inadequate, the matter goes to a comitology procedure, and a more protective measure may be
adopted. See Council Directive 90/425/EEC, 1990 O.J. L 224/29, art. 10.
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secondary instruments such as directive and regulations.53 Their research has addressed
the following types of questions. Why did the original member states delegate powers of
proposal and enforcement to the Commission and decide that, when voting in the
Council, the decision rule would sometimes be unanimity, other times qualified majority?
Why do some secondary instruments delegate rulemaking powers to the Commission
alone, others to the Commission acting together with a committee of national regulators?
And when the secondary legislation requires the Commission to act together with a
committee of national regulators, why is the committee sometimes given significant
power, i.e. regulatory or management committees, and sometimes given very little power,
i.e. advisory committees? Although the political science literature has largely ignored the
phenomenon of mixed administration, the same type of question can be asked: why do
the member states sometimes retain powers of rulemaking and enforcement and other
times choose to allow the Commission and other national regulators, sitting on
comitology committees, to supervise and influence domestic administration through
mixed procedure?
This is not the place to survey the burgeoning political science literature on EU
institutional design. Suffice it to say that, within the rational choice school alone, a
number of competing explanations have been advanced for delegations to supranational
institutions.54 According to some, supranational institutions offer superior information
on technical policy matters, above and beyond what can be generated by national
52

Commission notice on cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission in
handling cases falling within the scope of Articles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty, 1997 O.J. C 313/3, point 49.
53
See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht 73 (1998); Mark A. Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and
Agenda Setting in the EU 19-74 (2003).
54
For a masterful overview of the different theories, see Mark A. Pollack, The Engines of European
Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU 19-74 (2003).
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administrations. In a closely related argument, Mark Pollack has found evidence that
powers are delegated to the Commission and other European institutions when there is a
need for speedy and efficient European-wide decisionmaking.55 Giandomenico Majone
and Andrew Moravscik have separately advanced the hypothesis that transfers of power
to the Commission or collective decisionmaking processes in the Council and comitology
committees, through qualified majority voting, are driven by the need for credible
commitments.56 That is, in pursuing mutually beneficial policies such as free trade, the
member states operate in a classic prisoner’s dilemma game in which, over time, they
might be tempted to defect from the free trade line. Hence, to reassure the other parties
to the strategic interaction that they will not do so, member states commit themselves to
the policy by giving powers of monitoring, sanctioning, and future decisionmaking to
institutions with some degree of independence from national governments.
The information privacy case lends credence to neither the expertise nor the speed
theories. Both would have predicted transfers of authority in the data protection area.
Protecting individuals' personal data in the highly complex and rapidly changing field of
information technology is not self-evident, and supranational mechanisms which afforded
the prospect of more expert and speedier solutions should have been very attractive to the
member states. This, however, did not occur in the Data Protection Directive. Rather,
the member states which negotiated the Directive were extremely reluctant to transfer
policymaking authority to the Union.
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Id. at 107.
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2 European Union Governance 103 (2001); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose
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The dearth of mixed procedures is consistent, instead, with the credible
commitments theory. The Directive was highly contentious, with the result that even
after five years of continuous negotiations, the text ultimately adopted was so open-ended
that it could accommodate most of the existing differences among the member states. To
put it slightly differently, strong agreement on privacy rights was not forged in the
Directive. Since member states had radically different views on the importance of
privacy as a civil liberty, they were in no rush to credibly commit to a future stream of
decionmaking through a joint administrative scheme. In other words, they did not have
common interests in information privacy, or to the extent that they were common, the
preference was weak and the pay offs from the cooperative strategy were low. Moreover,
the policy on which they were in agreement, an internal market in personal data, did not
appear to be threatened by disparate information privacy regulations at the national level.
In the entire history of the policy area, which stretches back to the first German and
Swedish legislation in the early 1970's, there exist only a handful of examples where one
jurisdiction threatened to block an information transfer to another jurisdiction because of
privacy concerns.57
The bargaining history of the Directive contains significant evidence for this
hypothesis. First, the record shows that the member states actively opposed the
Commission's attempt to shift policymaking authority to European institutions, namely
the Commission and comitology committees. Although the Commission originally
57

The principal anecdote is a failed data transfer from France to Italy. Fiat-France wished to transfer
employee information to Fiat headquarters in Italy but the transfer was blocked by the French privacy
authority (CNIL). According to CNIL, the personal information of Fiat's French employees would not be
adequately protected once transferred to Italy because, at the time, Italy did not have a data protection law.
Only after Fiat-France and Fiat-Italy had signed a contract in which Fiat-Italy undertook to respect the
French law on privacy, did CNIL permit the transfer. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection
Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 471, 491 (1995) (describing episode).
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proposed an extensive role for joint administration, the member states subsequently
reduced that role to a minimum.
The original version of the Directive, proposed by the Commission in 1990, gave
the Commission rulemaking authority in all areas covered by the Directive.58
Furthermore, an advisory committee was created to monitor the Commission, meaning
that the member states would have had relatively little influence over the Commission.59
Therefore, had the initial proposal gone through, the Commission would have been able
to harmonize everything from notification and authorization processes to the specific
requirements for obtaining consumer consent and securing personal data, with only a
marginal role for the member states.
Over the course of the Council deliberations, however, the Commission's powers
were significantly reduced. In the Council, the member state representatives who worked
on the Directive for almost five years disagreed on many matters, but the Commission's
powers was not one of them. From the very beginning, they were unanimous on the need
for a stronger comitology committee of member states representatives to discipline the
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Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of
personal data, 1990 O.J. C 277/3, art. 29:
Exercise of rule-making powers
The Commission shall . . . adopt such technical measures as are necessary to apply this
Directive to the specific characteristics of certain sectors having regard to the state of the
art in this field and to the codes of conduct.
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Id. at art. 30. There are three types of committees of national representatives created to supervise the
Commission when it implements Community legislation: advisory, management, and regulatory
committees. The main difference is the degree of control they have over Commission decisionmaking.
With an advisory committee, the Commission must simply "take into account" the committee's opinion. A
management committee has a veto power over Commission decisions, meaning that it may vote against a
Commission decision, while a regulatory committee has the power of assent, meaning that it must vote in
favor of a Commission decision.
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Commission.60 Ultimately, a compromise was reached with the Parliament, generally
more supportive of the Commission position, in which a management committee, with
the power to veto the Commission's implementing measures, was instituted.61
Furthermore, towards the very end of the negotiations in the Council, at the point when
the Directive was escalated from the technical working party to the Committee of
Permanent Representatives, the Commission's executive powers were eliminated at
France’s insistence.62 All that was, and is, left, are the Commission's prerogatives in the
area of international data transfers, namely the ability to make adequacy determinations
and stipulate the conditions for transfers abroad. This signified the reduction of not only
the Commission's powers but also the powers of the national authorities acting
collectively on the management committee.
The member states also watered down the role initially contemplated for
European administration in the area of third country transfers. As explained previously,
the mixed procedure allows national regulators to authorize transfers to third countries
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Results of deliberations (travaux) of working party on "Economic questions" (Data protection) of
September 19, 1991, Council Doc. 8268/91. At this meeting, a large number of member states advocated a
regulatory committee. By late 1994, all of the member states, with the exception of Belgium, were in favor
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form (type IIIA). See Summary Minutes from the 1628th meeting of the Committee of Permanent
Representatives in Brussels, Thursday, November 14, 1994, Council Doc. 10957/94. The only difference
between the two types of regulatory committee is that, if the committee does not give its assent and the
Commission's proposed measure is sent to the Council, the Council may simply veto the measure rather
than having to agree on an alternative to the Commission's measure.
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Data Protection Directive, art. 31. The United Kingdom wanted to reject Parliament's amendment
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Council of Ministers of December 8, 1994, Council Doc. 11369/94. In this report, COREPER pointed out
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France's view, they should be eliminated. In the Council's version of the Directive, officially adopted on
February 24, 1995, the Commission's general rulemaking authority had vanished. See Communication of
the Commission to the European Parliament concerning the Council's common position, SEC (95) 303
final--COD 287, February 24, 1995.
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and then gives the Commission and member states the opportunity to object. The initial
versions of the Directive afforded greater protection for the right to object, giving
European actors--the Commission and the member states--a greater role in the national
decision on data transfers abroad. In the Commission's first proposal, a national decision
to allow a transfer to an inadequate third country could only take effect ten days after
notification to the Commission, to allow time for either the Commission or other member
states to object before the transfer occurred.63 In the Commission's second proposal, the
ten-day guarantee was replaced by a vaguer duty to notify the Commission and other
member states in "good time of its proposal to grant authorization."64 By the time the
Council had finished deliberating, the wait-and-see provision had disappeared altogether.
Under the Directive, member states must simply notify the Commission after the
authorization has been granted.65 The record of the Council negotiations shows that this
last modification was made after the UK, Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden objected that the
third country procedure was too "heavy" and "bureaucratic."66
Second, the negotiating history shows the extreme disagreement among national
representatives on privacy policy, lending support to the hypothesis that the member
states’ opposition to shared administrative authority was driven by disagreement over
substantive aims. On one extreme was the United Kingdom, supported to various
degrees by Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The
63

Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of
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Northern bloc did not see the need for a Data Protection Directive and would have
preferred to simply rely on the Council of Europe Convention, which all member states,
with the exception of Italy and Greece, had ratified and implemented. These member
states opposed a number of vital aspects of the Directive: the inclusion of manual data in
the definition of personal data, notification of data processing operations, authorization
for sensitive data, the broad definition of sensitive data, the procedure for third country
transfers, the right of individuals to access their information and object to its use, and the
prohibition on decisions based exclusively on automatic data processing. Throughout,
the Northern bloc criticized the Directive as bureaucratic, burdensome, and impractical.
In the end, in fact, the UK opposed the Directive by abstaining from the final vote in the
Council. On the other side was a bloc consisting of Italy, Belgium, Spain, and
Luxembourg. The result was that principles such as authorization were retained in the
final version of the Directive but they were written to allow for so many exceptions that
member states could sidestep them entirely in their implementation of the Directive.
The last piece of evidence in the Council record for this explanation links
opposition to common, European administration with a strong national view on privacy
policy. The minutes from the Council indicate that France was the main proponent of
eliminating the Commission's implementing powers.67 France is a country with a longstanding tradition of data protection as a basic liberty, with an extensive government
regulatory scheme. Although hardly dispositive, France's opposition is consistent with
the credible commitment hypothesis. France opposed conferring powers on the
Commission and committee of national regulators because its conception of privacy as a

Doc. 9957/94; Minutes from the 1628th meeting of COREPER, November 14, 1994, Council Doc.
10957/94.
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basic liberty, guaranteed by a tough national regulatory scheme, was at odds with the
approach elsewhere.
Because of the essential disagreement over the goals and means of data protection
legislation, administrative responsibility in the privacy area rests with national
administrations, not the Community institutions. Member states simply did not trust the
Commission, acting with other member states, to protect privacy rights and strike the
correct balance between civil liberties and the needs of information users, namely state
administration and the market. Each member state still understands privacy rights
differently and, given that the Directive made little headway toward a common definition,
the member states were reluctant to establish a European administrative process which
would, over time, develop such a definition.

Conclusion
The analysis of mixed administration in the data protection area has been driven
by two distinct questions, one normative and the other empirical. First, does shared
administrative responsibility between national and European institutions compromise
traditional administrative law values of rights and democratic accountability? Second,
why do countries decide in the first place to share policymaking authority with
supranational actors rather than keep it for themselves, as is normally the case in
international regimes? The answer to the first question is somewhat surprising. At least
in Italy, the formal procedure for third country transfers does not compromise fairness but
it does complicate accountability to the community of interested parties. More
significantly, the actual practice of third country transfers, which is characterized by
67
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failure to act and informal administrative action, poses a threat to values of fair and
democratic administration. This type of administrative action is notoriously difficult for
courts to police and the usual substitute, accountability of administrators to the political
process, is extremely weak in the European Union. On the second question, the answer
largely conforms with expectations of rational state behavior. Among the member states,
there was very little agreement on information privacy and therefore they resisted
relinquishing control and establishing a common, European administrative process. The
interest that was shared—the free flow of electronic data in the internal market—did not
require a strongly harmonized information privacy regime because the threat to trade
caused by different national approaches was insignificant.
This case study holds possible lessons for other areas of European governance and
other international regimes. Policymakers and national publics should take note of the
prevalence of inaction and informal administrative action in international regimes. There
certainly are advantages to supranational administration, for common solutions to
international problems can be crafted on a regular basis, but there are also costs. When
administrative authority is shared between national and supranational institutions, rights
and political accountability suffer, rights because courts cannot discipline inaction and
informal decisionmaking, political accountability because in the fragmented international
system nationally elected politicians can avoid taking responsibility for collective,
supranational decisionmaking.68 The results of the causal inquiry can also be extended.
When consensus on the substantive aims of policy emerges, countries can be expected to
transfer executive authority to collective institutions, both in the EU and elsewhere.
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